John Locke: Analysis of his arguments and writing
              (by Joshua Concessao)

In a time where the rich and poor are separated by enormous gaps in wealth, it is especially relevant to examine the philosophical foundations of our current political and economic systems in order to understand how these unequal distributions are made possible. It is all the more important to understand the justification for this system in light of the fact that rich western countries actively export liberal doctrines around the world and portray them as the best alternative politically, economically and morally. In the Second Treatise of Government, Locke demonstrates man's natural right to property; however, his argument for the unequal distribution of property and wealth, following in the state of nature, is contradictory to certain aspects that are fundamental to the pre-social state of man.

There are two fundamental principles found in the pre-social state described by Locke that demonstrate the contradiction inherent in his justification of the ownership of disproportionate amounts of either property or wealth.

The first is the principle of equality that states that every person born in the state of nature is, "promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of the same faculties, should also be equal amongst one another without subordination or subjection" (Second Treatise of Government §4) This implies a provision in the state of nature to the equal access of opportunities, with no one person given a special preference over another of the same “species or rank” (Second Treatise of Government §4).

The second principle found in the state of nature is that of fair distribution. Each person has, "As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in: whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others" (Second Treatise of Government §31). This guarantees that no person may use a resource any more than he or she can make good use of it. The rest is distributed between those others who can also make good use of that particular resource thereby avoiding waste.

For the purpose of my criticism and subsequent argument I will define society as the totality of all social relations that govern human behaviour, where social relations are the body of generalized rules that govern particular aspects of human behaviour. For example, economic systems govern the exchange of goods and services, politics governs the recognition of power and authority and their relationship, and culture broadly governs the informal interactions between people. Together, these bodies of rules form aspects of a whole that we know as society; however, if these rules are to affect the behaviour of human beings, then they must be based on the common agreement of all individuals in that society relating to the punishments associated with violation of the rules and rewards associated with conformity.

Locke's Second Treatise of Government is a justification for the private ownership of property. He does this in the state of nature tradition, which is a theory of the existence of man before the introduction of the social contract by which the person becomes part of a commonwealth. To understand the contradictions in Locke's justification for unequal property and wealth distribution, it is important to begin with an exposition of his particular state of nature thought experiment. More specifically, this exposition will deal with the origins of property and the manner in which the principles of equality and fair distribution are derived from the pre-social state.

The origins of property in the Second Treatise of Government are derived from the law of nature. Locke argues that the life that we have is given to us by God and it is His to take back from us. However, in receiving life, three things become our very own; a body that is given life, health that sustains the body, and labour that is done by the body in order to maintain and preserve its own good health. Locke asserts that God has given man all of the earth with all that it has to offer for man's common uses (Second Treatise of Government §25). This is the initial stepping stone from which Locke sets out his theory. At this point, every person has their own bodies, health, and labour to use as they please, but this does not extend to anything else in the world.

Locke argues that there is an essential difference between that which is held in common in nature and that which is taken from nature for personal use (Second Treatise of Government §28) and it is this difference then that will demonstrate the right to property. When a person removes an apple from a tree for the purpose of consuming it, another person may not demand to have that apple handed over to him or her, unless he or she owns the tree or the land upon which it stands (which is not a possibility at this point in Locke's argument as all things in the state of nature to this point are held in common). Although the tree and its fruits are held in common between all men, it is the taking of the fruit for a purpose that removes it from the common property of all men and places it in the possession of one individual, or more specifically, the one that removed it. But what transfers upon the apple the quality of being the property one individual as opposed to remaining in the common property of many? The answer to this, Locke argues, is labour (Second Treatise of Government §28).

Of the three things determined to be the property of the individual, it is labour, conducted in the interest of self preservation and the many forms that it might take, that extends the characteristic of property onto an object that is commonly held in nature (Second Treatise of Government §28). By labouring to remove the apple from the branches of the apple tree, the individual has put the apple into his possession, thereby denying to other individuals the right to that very apple. It must be noted that at no point in the argument so far has the tree or the land been transferred into the property of the individual and that they still remain in the common property of all persons to be made use of in the interest of their individual self-preservation. Therefore, Locke argues that an object becomes the property of a person when that person fixes his labour in that object and this process removes the right of any other individual to that specific object. Locke extends this thinking to also include the tree and the land upon which it rests. Consider this: the person picking the apple off the tree has not only fixed his labour with the particular apple, but has also been responsible for the growth of the tree by first planting the seed and subsequently nurturing it to its current form as an apple tree. Locke would argue that not only has the individual fixed his labour in just that one apple, but he has also fixed his labour in the entire tree, thereby making the tree and all of its fruit his property. In doing so, the individual has not only taken the apple from the common property of man, but has also taken the entire tree along with all the apples it produces, and in the process denied all other persons any claim to that particular tree and its produce.

While the apple and the tree are in the possession of the individual who has fixed his labour in them, the land up to this point remains in the common property of man. This then creates a contradiction; while the individual has a claim to the tree and its products, the rest of mankind has a claim to the land on which its sits and so an indirect claim to the tree itself along with its products. Not so, according to Locke. By nurturing the tree, the individual responsible has increased the productivity of the land on which the tree sits and in doing so has also fixed his labour in the land. And so, by fixing his labour in apple, tree, and land, all three objects become his property with no other individual having the right to lay claim to any of them (Second Treatise of Government §32).

In addition to demonstrating the natural right to property, Locke also states that in the pre-social state of man, individuals of the same “species and rank” are born equal to all the advantages and opportunities of nature (Second Treatise of Government §4). Locke argues that in the state of nature, while all of earth being held in common is available to the individual to fix his labour upon and make his property, he can only rightly claim so much as his property as that of which he can make good use without creating waste. This arises out of the fact that there are specific limitations on the amount of work we can do, and having done that work, we are also limited in the amount of objects that we can consume.

Locke argues further that to overcome the problem of waste, man in the pre-social state began to barter that which was a surplus. While this overcomes the problem of things going to waste, it does not solve the problem of things spoiling over time. To illustrate this more clearly, consider this example: an individual may decide to avoid the waste of an apple that is a surplus by trading, but he cannot overcome the problem of having that apple spoil before he might want to trade it. Locke argues that man solves this problem by introducing money, which is an item that does not have any intrinsic value except that which is accorded to it by the common agreement between many individuals, and which is an item that will not perish (Second Treatise of Government §46, §47). It is only with the introduction of money that the issue of inequality and disproportionate distribution arises. While on one hand, nature guarantees individuals the right to property, equality, and fair distribution of resources, man circumvents this natural law in order to satisfy the desire to have more than he needs. By including the creation of money in the state of nature, Locke argues that it is just as much a part of the pre-social state as is property or equality, and in that setting, the foundation for the justification of inequality (Second Treatise of Government §50).

Money is a creation of man, and its existence is contingent upon there being a common agreement upon its value. That any semblance of value attached to it is arrived at only through common agreement is evident in the fact that if we were to give a ten dollar bill to a person who remained in a pre-social state, that individual would not be able to discern through reason the value of the ten dollar bill unless its value were demonstrated in comparison to an object found in nature. It then follows that there is no natural law discernable by reason that can demonstrate that money is a fundamental aspect of the state of nature. The very fact that its value must be agreed upon verifies that it is a social creation and in that sense is very much the beginnings of a social contract.

However, noting that money is entirely a social creation, its purpose or function becomes the direct contravention of the laws of nature. That it has a function is observable through its development as a tool to avoid the problem of waste and spoilage where resources are concerned. That this function is a circumvention of natural law is observable in that it is only through the introduction of money, a social creation, that the principle of equality and fair distribution are reduced to mere notions while certain individuals enjoy unfettered access to resources while others are denied the basic necessities of life.

If Locke wishes us to derive the right to property in natural law and insists that since it is so it must be guaranteed under the positive law created by man, we must then assume that all positive law for Locke must have its basis in the laws of nature. From this it then follows that not only should we have a guaranteed and protected right to property in positive law, but also a guaranteed and protected right to equality and fair distribution, since both of these rights are found in natural law. If this is the case, then the function of money is not just a circumvention of natural law, but it is also a circumvention of positive law. If money is a circumvention of positive law, then it would seem that being in contradiction to positive law, the law of man is obligated to see to its abolition; however, this is not a viable option.

Since Locke places the creation of money in the state of nature, and since its creation is the first act of common agreement, money then becomes the founding act of common agreement from which all other acts of common agreement are achieved and which leads to the formation of society. If positive law were to abolish money, it would then rob society of its foundation, and society, being the author of positive law, would cease to exist.

Since we cannot rid ourselves of money, we cannot have a complete solution to this problem; however, through positive law, its effects may be negated. Legislation may be instituted that rectifies that problem by redistributing wealth so that inequality and unfair distribution are avoided. Of course, this begets the problem that restrictions are placed on our freedoms and the government that is envisioned in Locke's liberal state.

Since Locke defines freedom as men's ability to "order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and person, as they think fit, within he bounds of the laws of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any other man" (Second Treatise of Government §4), it can be argued that the limitations placed on the ownership of wealth are still in accordance with a state of freedom. Since the nature of money is to circumvent the laws of nature, any legislation preventing this would only be created with the intent of allowing people to dispose of their actions and possessions within the bounds of nature, namely those of equality and fair distribution, thereby preserving freedom. As for a limited government, if we are to follow Locke's premises as he defines them in the state of nature, we cannot help but arrive at the conclusion that a government that is highly involved cannot be avoided and is in fact desirable if we are to maintain a state of equality and fair distribution.

Where Locke himself attempted to justify a liberal doctrine, one that espoused inequality and disproportionate distribution, we cannot help but logically deduce from his premises that these qualities of Locke's liberal doctrine stand in stark contrast to his version of the state of nature. Furthermore, Locke paints us a picture of society that is inherently unstable and unable to reconcile itself with its contradictions. Given that Locke's theory is inherently contradictory, are we right in proclaiming it as the better alternative politically, economically, or most importantly, morally? The answer would have to be no, for it does not solve any of the problems that seem to plague all political systems, namely inequality and unfair distribution.

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