five minutes to midnight
- - - July 1, 2003
volume 1, issue 1
Table of Contents
Letter From the Editor
Peace in Congo: A Four-Phase Plan
Lebanon, Somalia, and Iraq's Eerie
Similarities
Comment: Don't Believe Everything You Read
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Wow! One month of work and we finally got through to the first issue. Looking back on June and pondering on the successes and failures Five Minutes to Midnight has already been through is almost humbling, though quite gratifying at the same time. The first, groundbreaking issue is actually going out to more than fifty subscribers from varying demographics, as well as some larger organizations. It is incredible how much has been done and none of it could be possible without the support of those involved from the publication's conception. A special thanks goes out to all who participate in the forum - your heated debates have acted as a moral stimulus that has kept me up late into the night, trying to create an issue that will serve as yet another source of information for your incredibly informed minds.
I'll leave this letter to the above, making it short so more time can be spent on reading the actual articles. The structure of the publication may change in the future, as this is only the first issue. If anyone has any comments or suggestions, do not hesitate to contact us! Aspiring writers are also welcome and so are editorials, comments, rebuttals, and general rants from the readers. Thank you, and enjoy!
- Wojciech Gryc
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Peace in Congo: A Four-Phase Plan by Joshua Concessao
For almost five years, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has experienced a brutal civil war that has laid claim to anywhere between 3.1 million to 4.7 million lives. The current conflict that has embroiled the country since 1998 originated with an Ugandan and Rwandan backed attempt to undermine the government at the time. Since then, numerous human right abuses have occurred on all sides of the conflict, with each abuse worse than the other. The most recent abuse reported revealed that militias had turned to cannibalism.
In response to the situation, the UN dispatched a 700 strong force of Uruguayan peacekeepers. However, the size of the mission proved too small to afford the civilian population any sort of protection or to put an end to the constant fighting. More recently, 1400 French soldiers have taken up positions in Bunia with a relatively strong mandate to protect the civilian population. This, unfortunately, does not include bringing an end to fighting outside Bunia. In addition, the French have planned to leave by September 1st, when they will be replaced by 3000 Bangladeshi soldiers.
While the numbers may seem large, the truth about the matter is that the UN is not doing enough to put an end to civil strife in Congo. Part of the reason is that the problem is constantly viewed in the short term. The periods for mandates are for months when they should be for years. People have to realize that this is not something that will go away anytime soon. It requires concrete goals with long-term plans and a huge commitment from the international community. Another aspect is that countries are generally unwilling to do anything significant about the situation. This is characterized by the fact that the French have only agreed to a four month tour, while the U.S., Britain and scores of other countries have refused to participate in any effort to end hostilities. Finally, the main reason for the general failure of the whole mission is the UN itself. This is not to say that UN has become an insignificant institution, in fact, quite the opposite is true. The UN has unparalleled expertise in the realm of peacekeeping and providing humanitarian aid. However, Congo requires peacemaking not peacekeeping. In light of this, the most potent organization for such an operation would be NATO.
Allow me to explain. In a time where regime change and government engineering are all the craze, the DRC provides the most fertile ground upon which to plant the seeds of peace, prosperity and security. While all this rhetoric sounds like it may have been lifted from a speech written for George Bush Jr., there is some merit to it. Call it the Congo Peace Plan. It would require four phases that would see the involvement of NATO and the UN acting together in order to bring an end to the civil war and build national institutions through which the country may be governed.
Phase 1
Phase 1 would see a large multinational contingent of NATO troops on the ground. Their initial mandate would be to rapidly oversee the dismantling and elimination of all rebel factions along with all government military forces. This would then be followed by a systematic disarmament of the people. As this is being achieved, the UN would deploy peacekeepers to zones that have already been declared free from continuous fighting. To counter the risk of a humanitarian crisis that normally follows such operations, UN agencies like the WHO and FAO would have already prepared to enter the theatre along with the peacekeepers. Once all of the above has been achieved, efforts would then be turned to strengthening internal security. The first step in this is to create a national police force that would be trained either by the peacekeepers or by NATO troops. At this point, overall control of the country would rest in the hands of NATO.
The success of Phase 1 rests on the ability of the troops to carry out operations rapidly. A time frame for this phase has be deliberately left out simply because military operations of this scope are best left unhindered by such constraints. The objective of this phase is to win the hearts and minds of the people by providing much needed security and humanitarian aid. Another goal of the hearts and minds campaign is to undermine the current government's authority. Efforts must be placed on getting the people to recognize the authority of both the UN and NATO as these organizations would be key players in rebuilding the country.
Phase 2
Phase 2 would result in the transfer of control to the UN from NATO. The mandate of NATO would change to providing security from internal and external threats. The UN would undertake the job of rebuilding and controlling various public and government institutions through which the country would be governed. In addition, foreign companies would begin to invest in the country's vast natural resources. This would not be a difficult goal to achieve since there are a number of foreign companies in Congo already.
The overall idea behind Phase 2 is to create a public authority that is recognized and obeyed by the people of Congo. One of the main problems that plague most governments in the third world is rampant corruption. Consequently, the government institutions would have to be administered by the UN. Another important goal is to create an economy within the country. Stability cannot be achieved without some form of prosperity.
Phase 3
During phase 3, control of power would be transferred to Congolese authorities. The UN would remain in an advisory role to provide help as it is needed. By this time, a strong and uncorrupt police force would have to be in place in order to provide internal security. The UN peacekeepers would still have to provide additional security along with a small force of NATO soldiers. It is important to note that so far the creation of a national military force has been avoided to this point. This has been purposely left out in order to avoid military coups and disturbances of the sort.
Phase 4
This is the final phase of the plan. Up until this point, the plan would have seen the creation of public institutions whose authority is recognized by the general population accompanied by the transfer of control of these institutions to Congolese authorities. Furthermore, the groundwork for a robust economy would have already been laid down. In addition, the responsibility for internal security would now be handled by the Congolese government. The last remaining requirement for this plan is to create a military force that can prevent the type of external interference that initially led to the current set of hostilities. In this, both NATO and the UN would play an extremely important role. It is imperative that the military force be modern and well trained. It must be capable to handle a wide range of undesirable situations that may arise while at the same time unable to interfere in the internal affairs of the country. This is one thing that must be ensured at all costs, the military should not be able to undermine the authority of the government.
Now, the first thought that comes to mind is that this plan is overly ambitious, even ludicrous. This plan would require years to achieve and an extremely large amount of money. The type of commitment this requires is impossible to achieve. Furthermore, the plan depends on everything going smoothly, which almost never happens. Finally, the question that has to be asked is, "Is this our fight?"
Well, yes it is. It must be noted that the groundwork for the current hostilities was first placed by the withdrawal of European imperial powers from Africa. This led to a power vacuum, which in turn has led to years of political instability and civil strife in the whole continent. The ideology of imperialism and colonialism led to the total disruption of the social structures within African society. However, this is not just limited to the African continent. The effects of colonialism can be observed all over the third world. In effect, the woes of today were created by the glories of yesterday.
In the case of Congo, we have a moral imperative to set a wrong right.
The important question is, will it actually happen? In this, I have decided to be realistic in saying no. The high level of commitment that is required by such action would never be mustered up by the international community. Nevertheless, it is always interesting to imagine about what could be.
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Lebanon, Somalia, and Iraq's Eerie Similarities by Wojciech Gryc
The Globe and Mail, a popular Canadian newspaper, recently published an article about a twelve year-old girl and her anti-American ambitions. Armed with an AK-47, she shot at some soldiers, though did not cause any fatalities. In response to this, as well as many other incidents that have actually lead to deaths among soldiers from the occupying powers, one US soldier said, "Get me out of here, this place is too dangerous." As guerilla warfare and tactics mirroring those of terrorists are used more frequently in Iraq, many more coalition soldiers may utter words similar to those quoted above. This is unnerving, to say the least, especially if there are enough fatalities to convince the US government to move out of Iraq before it successfully implements an Iraqi democracy. This would not happen any time soon, though the possibility is looming in the not-too-distance future if the number of deaths increases proportionally with the amount of rebellion.
Peacekeeping and military operations have failed in the past, and their outcome is never something to be proud of. Two such operations include the US led Multinational Force (MNF) in Lebanon and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. Both problems have fairly long and somewhat complicated histories, so the descriptions below will be synopses and are only used to show how failed peacekeeping operations can prolong conflicts and, for the purpose of this article, to show how there are similar events slowly unfolding in Iraq.
The first of the two issues, related to the MNF, deals with the Lebanese civil war of 1975 to 1991. The peacekeeping force was sent in August 1982 to keep peace among the many different factions fighting on both a national and international level. The conflict consisted of a large array of factions, from Israel's invasion and insistence on self-defense through the use of military force, Syria's large military presence, and rising tensions between religious groups, though mainly those affiliated with the Christian government and Muslim citizenry. Judging by the dates, anyone can see that the MNF was not very successful in keeping the peace, as the war lasted for nine years after the force's inception.
In truth, however, the peacekeeping initiative was cut short in February 1984. Although one can write many pages on this issue alone, it will suffice to say that due the resistance and terrorist actions taking place against the peacekeeping initiative, it was decided by the powers-that-be to move out - the territory was too dangerous and no real progress was being made. The problem, in essence, rested in the fact that the Muslim majority saw the MNF as a military initiative to keep the Christian government in power. This, and many other problems, led to the terrorist attacks mentioned above. There were plenty and luckily, Iraq has not seen attacks of this magnitude yet and hopefully will never bear witness to them. One terrorist attack which bears the most importance and, when it occurred, was given much coverage took place on October 23, 1983, when a truck filled with explosives drove past a temporary US Marine headquarters and was detonated. During and after the attack, 241 marines lost their lives.
Due to this and many other such attacks, as well as the MNF's military and political inactivity, it was decided to scrap the peacekeeping operation. The force's withdrawal was followed by about seven more years of war and more economic, political, and developmental problems for the country of Lebanon. At the present, Lebanon is doing better than during the civil war, but many problems still plague the country. The country recently made the news when Air Canada was forced to cancel its plans for having direct flights from Canada to Lebanon due to terrorist threats. Additionally, Syria's troops, which have been in the country since 1976, have no intention of leaving and there are some nagging territorial disputes with Israel.
Somalia has faced a similar situation. Around the time when the Lebanese were finally solving their civil disputes, clans in Somalia began to argue and fight. Once again, a US-led peacekeeping force was sent during December 1992 to help solve some of the problems plaguing the country. Operation Restore Hope, as it was called, took on the task of spreading humanitarian aid and, of course, restoring and keeping the peace. One of the preferred methods of achieving peace, however, was to abduct warlords and raid their headquarters. This was by no means an easy task and in a country whose citizens paraded dead US soldiers through the streets after failed operations, it was not something that won the hearts and admiration of throngs of people. A popular example of the fighting that went on in Somalia was portrayed in "Black Hawk Down", where a group of elite US soldiers tried to abduct warlords in Mogadishu but suffered eighteen casualties at the hands of angry Somalis.
After the incident in Mogadishu, the military operation was publicly criticized by many American citizens who called for an immediate withdrawal of US forces. Against the public's wishes, however, the US military continued to fight for peace in Somalia but, failing at bringing about any major change, was finally sent home in 1994. Upon losing the 30,000 US troops backing Operation Restore Hope, the UN was forced to leave a year later - if a large US military operation supporting the UN peace keeping mission failed to do its job, there was no way a smaller version would be anywhere near as close to success. Sadly, the final remnants of the peacekeeping force left with much criticism on their backs: aside from failing in keeping the peace, many soldiers came home to allegations of cruelty and even the murder of many innocent Somalis.
Today, the CIA World Factbook explains the Somali situation best: "Numerous warlords and factions are still fighting for control of Mogadishu and the other southern regions. Suspicion of Somali links with global terrorism complicate the picture." The devastation created by the civil war is only magnified by frequent droughts and hot weather that stimulate famine, causing many to go hungry and even die from malnutrition. Operation Restore Hope was meant to alleviate these and many other problems and it was successful in doing so, until high casualty rates forced the US and other countries to move out before the peacekeeping and humanitarian aid process was complete.
At this point in time, it is too early to make drastic or jaw-dropping comparisons to the two situations above with that of the current Iraqi conflict. However, it would suffice to say that after the short-lived war against the Hussein regime, the rebuilding of Iraq, Operation Restore Hope, and the Multinational Force in Lebanon seem to have a few similarities that may eventually serve to make Iraq yet another example of a failed military campaign. These include:
As the three points above are given more and more time to mold and meld into an organized structure, the amount of attacks against coalition forces will not be isolated to the Sunni Triangle, which is located around Baghdad and Tikrit and is place to most of the rebellion against the US. Time is of the essence in the rebuilding of Iraq simply because as time moves on, more people will be angry with the US' lax rebuilding process. Even now, the fighting is starting to increase from what was originally a relatively peaceful area to the infamous Sunni Triangle and the targeting of British troops, which were allegedly receiving great co-operation from Iraqi citizens. Simply put, the longer the coalition forces stay in Iraq, the more they will seem like occupational forces to the citizens and this will cause more resentment and much more terrorist-like activity, guerilla warfare, and attacks.
In addition to moving quickly, the best option would be to work and listen to the Iraqi people. There is much resentment from Muslim holy men, soldiers who lost their jobs, and the general population who is simply angry with the US. After creating an Iraqi administration or prelude to a democratic government, it is important to show the people it is a government that represents them well and will do all it can to help the Iraqi people rather than play a puppet to George Bush. Essentially, such a government could work as a much needed link between the people and the coalition forces. This will in turn bring upon a high level of cooperation between the two groups, thereby reducing the amount of displeased people and lowering the amount of attacks because that is what eventually drives the peacekeepers or troops out.
Every country is willing to pay a price for peace or stability in another country, but once this price is reached and no visible change has been produced, the peacekeeping country's citizens and in some cases, even the government, begin to fear more losses and move out of the country as fast as possible. This is not a solution, however, as countries depending on tens of thousands of peacekeepers who distribute humanitarian aid and supplies suffer drastically when the source of at least some of the law and order move out and leave the people to themselves. This is what causes civil wars to last several years longer, or instability that, when accompanied by drought and famine, could lead to hundreds of thousands of deaths. To avoid such a situation in Iraq, it is important that an acceptable interim government be created as soon as possible. If this does not happen, the amount of attacks, terrorism, and guerilla warfare in Iraq will increase and may do so to such levels that force the US and its allies out prematurely, leaving Iraqis to fend for themselves at a time when international aid is crucial to the country's success. All eyes, therefore, are on George Bush and the coalition: act fast, act now, and save American and Iraqi lives later. Be warned, however - the road you are traveling bears resemblance to those of your past failures.
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Comment: Don't Believe Everything You Read by Wojciech Gryc
Almost a paradox, if one thinks about such a title being published by a periodical. Nevertheless, it has dawned upon me how certain companies choose to disseminate misinformation and pass it on to their readers. It has come to my attention that on the quest for truth and completely informative articles, reading certain texts can become a stumbling block rather than an easily walked path to success. Surely, that shouldn't come as a surprise... Until you realize that these "stumbling blocks" were two famous entities: CNN.com and The Globe and Mail.
Though Five Minutes to Midnight is not a large news magazine and does not have the same customer base as the aforementioned companies, it still takes pride in knowing that all of the information it publishes has been looked over and checked for accuracy. When posting new information, we make sure that it is the whole story (or as much of it as we could find) - sometimes half-truths are just as bad as lies.
The articles that sparked my interest were printed around the time of the G8 summit in Evian, France. The violent protests and angry police officers are bad enough to read about, especially when they bear eerie, though less violent, similarities to Zimbabwe's problems. When looking through these articles, I noticed in each a sentence or two about one particular protestor: Martin Shaw. He was allegedly hanging from a bridge as a form of protest until a police officer came by and cut the rope. The protestor fell 20 feet into a shallow stream and suffered multiple fractures. The police officer, upon investigation, stated he did not know a protestor was hanging there.
Fury ran through me like wildfire.
Of course he knew was someone there! A police officer cutting a rope for no reason would be the most incompetent act of law enforcement I'd have ever heard of, while cutting a rope to quell the anger of a protestor is downright a violation of that protestor's rights.
Immediately, I made a note to tell our readers about this mess of events. Soon after, I decided to write this instead simply because I decided to research the matter. Reading through more articles brought the slow realization that the police officer did all he could. What those two news conglomerates did not mention was the fact that this rope was tied across a bridge, displaying an anti-G8 sign, and held down by a woman hanging from the opposite end. A group of officers held the rope on one end, supporting the woman, while the original officer cut the rope, unknowingly letting Mr. Shaw fall. Although this still raises the question of "Didn't they see him," it does give more credibility to the officer's defense; it's one thing to cut a rope for no reason, and another to do so because it was blocking traffic and in effect, protecting 50% of attached protestors while doing so.
The new question I'm asking is simply why CNN.com and The Globe and Mail did not write a bit more about Mr. Shaw. Clearly, their verbal expression was misleading and full of temerity. This is what Five Minutes to Midnight will aim not to do. This won't be easy, as there is a wide array of inaccurate information floating around the world, but we will try to the best of our abilities.
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Sources for "Peace in Congo: A Four-Phase Plan"
“Congo,” The World Book Encyclopedia, 1994 ed.Congo, Democratic Republic of the. CIA World Factbook 2002. 19 March 2003. 24 June 2003. < http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cg.html >
“Peacekeeping
in Congo,” The Economist,
14th-20th June 2003, p. 43
Sources for "Lebanon, Somalia, and Iraq's Eerie Similarities"
Lebanon. CIA World Factbook 2002. 19 March 2003. 27 June 2003. < http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/le.html >
MacKinnon, Mark. "Iraqi girl, 12, latest recruit in guerilla fight against U.S." The Globe and Mail, 24 June 2003, p. A13.
Somalia. CIA World Factbook 2002. 19 March 2003. 27 June 2003. < http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/so.html >
Somalia: Timeline. ABC News. 27 June 2003. < http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/somalia_timeline.html >
US Multinational Force [USMNF] Lebanon. 27 June 1998. 27 June 2003. < http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/usmnf.htm >