Nuclear Destruction: Past and Present Tales of Woe
(by Wojciech Gryc)
With the recent nuclear developments in Iran and North Korea, fear of nuclear weapons is once again hitting newspapers, websites, and the public on a regular basis. Indeed, with the ability to kill millions of people, nuclear weapons are not a topic most people approach with ease. While the focus has often been on "evil regimes" trying to obtain nuclear weapons, one must also realize that nuclear weapons and even security measures designed to detect nuclear weapon launches put the world at risk of ultimate destruction.
This is not explicitly referring to the idea that the US, Russia, China, and others should destroy their nuclear stockpiles. Such is a useful discussion and in the cases presented below, probably the best solution to avoiding world-wide destruction. While governments say they do their best to keep their own weapons safe and to avoid irrational decisions, many often fail or make mistakes, many of which are not discussed or released to the public. Indeed, since the start of the Cold War – and even during its aftermath – the world has come uncomfortably close to obliteration and not because of any actual nuclear launches, but due to the sometimes faulty technology used to detect them.
Both the East and West are at fault in this regard. The most popular set of examples may be found within the Cuban Missile Crisis. In October 1962, the US was alarmed after finding that the Soviets were building nuclear launch facilities in Cuba – much too close for comfort to the United States. Relations between the USSR and US were more tense during this time, and some say the world came closest to nuclear war at this point in history. The individual incidents of the Crisis are most interesting, however. During the war, both sides had surveillance planes and bombers continuously patrolling their borders to ensure safety. In one such flight, a U2 reconaissance plane flew into Soviet airspace, and MiG fighter planes were dispatched to shoot it down. The U2 pilots were flying back to the US and ran out of fuel, and began to glide to Alaska. To protect this plane, the US launched F102-A fighter planes to protect the U2, all of which were armed with nuclear weapons, and pilots were ordered to use the weapons at their own discretion: the final decision of using the weapons was left to the pilots, and no one else.
Another US-based example took place in November 1979. On the morning of November 9, four different command centres, include that of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and Pentagon National Military Command Center noticed a large fleet of Soviet missiles heading for the US. Within the next minutes, a retaliatory attack was planned and ready to begin, ensuring the destruction of the USSR. There was complete panic at the military headquarters, and the President could not be found. A few last minute checks uncovered that there was no Soviet strike taking place, but rather, someone had start playing a training tape in one of the computers connected to the entire military defence infrastructure.
The USSR also had its blunders, the first of which may be the closest the world has ever gotten to a nuclear apocalypse. Around the Autumnal Equinox of 1983, a new fleet of Soviet spy satellites reported a nuclear missile launch from the US, though in reality, this was a malfunction caused by their position relative to the Earth during the yearly equinox. Specifically, there were five missiles detected, and the decision to retaliate came down to one man, Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov, who had a gut feeling that this was not a real strike – such a strike would not take place with simply five missiles. He had minutes to make a decision and decided to not respond with Soviet missiles, directly contravening military orders but avoiding an unnecessary and disastrous nuclear launch. Following the event, Petrov was dismissed from his post and moved to a less sensitive military post due to his contravention of orders. While it ruined his professional career, his decision could be seen as "saving the world".
A final, disturbingly recent event took place in 1995 during a Norwegian missile launch. This launch took place for scientific purposes, with a missile modified to contain meteorological tools rather than a nuclear payload. When launched, Russia's radar detected the missile and the military believed it was an initial launch to disable its radar systems before a larger attack. Preparations were started to launch a retaliatory attack, though Russian President Boris Yeltsin did not order one. Today, Russian authorities say the Western media blew the incident out of proportion, though most are certain the military was put on alert after the launch. A follow-up investigation showed that all political and administrative precautions were taken for the launch, and the Russian military was not informed due to a bureaucratic mix-up.
The above examples illustrate just how sensitive the world was, and still is, to nuclear war. The cases above show that the decisions to retaliate or start an attack were often left to unelected individuals few people know about – fighter pilots in the US, and a high-ranking military officer in the USSR. Furthermore, the world has come uncomfortably close to disaster due to simple mistakes, like the running of training tape or a bureaucratic mix-up. Steps have been taken to improve the situation and make the world safer; however, gaps in the Russian radar system ensuring the safety of the country's airspace can make military officers paranoid, while talks between the US and Russia to create a joint institution to ensure nuclear and miliary safety between the two nations have produced few results.
This is all concerning, as the world becomes more paranoid about nuclear weapons. Recent news reports state that Iran may have weapons that can now reach Europe, and little has been done to ameliorate the standoff between Iran or North Korea. This may only be exacerbated by the development of new ballistic missile defense systems. Such systems, while striving to provide cover and increase safety for citizens, may only promote a race to develop newer, faster, and smarter weapons. Such systems are not immune to human or technical error, and some say it is only a matter of time before a simple military or political mistake will escalate into a global nuclear war.
Sources
Phillips, Alan F. "20 Mishaps that Might Have Started Accidental Nuclear War" Waging Peace Jan. 1998. http://www.wagingpeace.org/articles/1998/01/00_phillips_20-mishaps.htm
"False Alarms on the Nuclear Front" PBS. Oct. 2001. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/missileers/falsealarms.html
"Stanislav Petrov — World Hero" http://www.brightstarsound.com/world_hero/article.html
"Cold-War Doctrines Refuse to Die" Washington Post Mar. 18. 1998. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/coldwar/shatter031598a.htm
"False alarm, nuclear danger”. IEEE. March 2000. http://www.armscontrol.ru/Start/publications/spectrum-ews.htm
"Ka-boom or bust: The U.S. missile defence system". CBC. Dec 6. 2004. http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/us_missiledefence/
"Israel: Iran missiles can reach Europe" Aljazeera Apr 27. 2006. http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/2BB6CAD9-9E22-4773-B2E9-9092DF52A849.htm
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