A Nation Divided (by Arash Rowshanzamir)

Political developments in the Middle East once again captured headlines this past month as a result of Ariel Sharon's historic decision to evacuate all of Israel's settlements from the Gaza Strip, in addition to withdrawing from pockets of occupied territory in the northern portion of the West Bank. The move was welcomed around the world, particularly in Washington, as many began to describe it as a step in the right direction and a watershed event with the potential of rendering an end to several decades of brutal violence in the region. It was the domestic situation in Israel, however, that became the center of attention as political developments began to exacerbate tensions entrenched right in the center of Israel's political spectrum.

And although some warned of an apocalyptic battle between ultra-orthodox Jews scattered in various synagogues and forts in the hard-line settlements and the Israeli army, the entire pullout took just a little over a week to complete. The majority of the settlers actually left early in a peaceful manner, but there were pockets of fierce resistance, primarily in two isolated settlements in the West Bank: Sa Nur and Homesh. In several instances, the police resorted to using tear gas and water cannons to control those bent on violent resistance, many of whom were conservative Jews who had come to the settlements to replace the settlers that had already left. The will of those bent on opposition eventually began to crumble, and the hard-line settlements were fully evacuated.

As predicted, the disengagement plan created a severe rift within Israel, most noticeably between mainstream secular Jews, many of whom share Ariel Sharon's vision of sacrificing Gaza in exchange for the prospect of peace, and hard-line orthodox Jews, who see the pullout as being tantamount to betrayal. The confusion of those who opposed the pullout stemmed from the fact that it was actually the Israeli government that encouraged settler expansion in Gaza in the first place. Furthermore, many within the hard-line camp are skeptical as to how much of an effect the pullout will have on reducing the wave of brutality caused by the fundamentalists of Hamas and other militant organizations. They fear that Israel's withdrawal will only serve to show Palestinian extremists that terrorism works, and if anything, will only result in further acts of violence perpetrated against Israeli civilians. In fact, the political tension generated by those opposed to the pullout became so charged that many began comparing it to the days preceding the assassination of former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995.

So what are some of the reasons behind Ariel Sharon's pullout? Practicality would be the best place to start. The Gaza strip has been a financial and security burden for Israel ever since its occupation in 1967. Providing protection in the form of checkpoints and roadblocks for Gaza's Jewish population does not make any sense logistically nor is it rational economically when one considers the fact that almost all of the inhabitants of Gaza are Palestinian. Another reason for the disengagement plan lies in Mr. Sharon's desire to paint a picture of political co-operation. By pulling out of Gaza, Israel will have shown to the international community that is fully committed to a two-state solution in addition to re-affirming its loyalty to the peace process and the road map. Furthermore, the disengagement plan will serve to divert attention back to the Fundamentalists of Hamas and other hard line Islamic organizations, many of whom are under the impression that the entire disengagement plan was as a result of the intifada.

Ironically enough, although Israel will be evacuating all of its settlements, the Gaza strip will still be occupied territory as Israel will retain control of its borders and the Israeli government can decide to send its army back into Gaza if it deems such action as being necessary. Finally, by pulling out of Gaza unilaterally, Ariel Sharon now has the ability to put his foot down on the subject of maintaining Israel's presence in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. This could be a major problem given the fact that there were only around 8,000 Israeli citizens living in Gaza to begin with, while the number of Israelis living in occupied territory in the West Bank is approximately 400,000.

The pullout was unpopular with many conservative Jews, and many within Israel's hard-line right began labeling Mr. Sharon as a traitor. Comparisons were also made between the pullout of Gaza and Nazi treatment of Jews throughout the duration of the Holocaust. However, the fact of the matter is that the majority of Israeli citizens actually supported the decision. The prospect of giving up Gaza became appealing to those who were becoming increasingly frustrated at the lack of progress made as a result of rhetorical negotiation between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. Fostering public support never proved difficult for Israel's Prime Minister; it was appeasing the critics within the his own government that proved to be the most frustrating challenge of all.

Mr. Sharon may have succeeded in carrying out his plan but he did so at the expense of losing an enormous amount of political capital. Mr. Sharon's unilateral inclinations resulted in him ignoring the vote of his own Likud party on the matter of disengagement, dismissing ministers who would not support the pullout and rejecting a national referendum on the issue. Mr. Sharon's decline in the polls 14 months before a national election was taken advantage of by former finance minister Binyamin Netanyahu who resigned his post in an act of protest to the pullout and now poses the biggest threat to Likud.

All is not lost for Mr. Sharon, however. Although Mr. Netanyahu might be ahead in the polls for the time being, Mr. Sharon still has the option of uniting with Shimon Peres, the head of the Labor Party, to create a new center-right party consisting of loyal Likud members and those in the Labor Party who supported the pullout.

The question that has to be asked is relatively simple: what now? The political consequences of Mr. Sharon's recent actions have rendered him paralyzed, and if he wants to have any chance of retaining power by the time the general election comes around in November of next year, he will have to abstain from making large scale decisions unilaterally. Furthermore, it is highly probable that the whole pullout was implemented so that Mr. Sharon would have the ability to continue expansion in the West Bank, a factor that will inevitably be the main obstacle for sustainable peace between the two sides.

The one truly positive consequence of the pullout is the fact that it will bolster the popularity of the Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas. Mr. Abbas will need all the help he can get if he has any serious ambitions of tackling the economic problems that have plagued the Palestinian people and if he is to have a realistic chance of exerting any type of control over the militants of Hamas. And if history has taught the world anything it is that violence between Israeli's and Palestinians will persist as long as there are Jewish settlers on occupied Palestinian territory.

If Mr. Sharon's ambitions do actually revolve around the creation of two separate states that have the ability to live side be side in peace, which is something that he adamantly defends, then it would be best if he were to set his sights on East Jerusalem and then finally on the West Bank.

Sources

McGreal, Chris. "After Gaza, Sharon's next aim is ... do nothing." The Guardian. 26 Aug. 2005. 1 Sep. 2005. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,1556576,00.html>.

"Q&A: Gaza and West Bank withdrawal." The Guardian. 15 Aug. 2005. 1 Sep. 2005. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/israel/Story/0,2763,1542507,00.html>.

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